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Erik S. Knutsen*

Clarifying Causation in Tort

This article argues that there is nothing overly confusing about the law of causation
in negligence. It attempts to define the current state of causation in Canadian
negligence law with a simple goal in mind: to have a clearer more productive
conversation about the law with the fundamental concepts clearly on the table.
The author argues that while the leading decisions on causation are often couched
in broad-based, universal terminology to refrain from inhibiting conceptual
portability, the cases can be read as a sustained continuum of conversations about
causation. A cohesive framework for the law is offered by taking a longitudinal
perspective and focusing on the simple themes of Canadian tort law present in
the causation jurisprudence: the doctrinal tests for causation, evidence for proving
causation, thin skulls, and crumbing skulls. Avoiding a case-by-case dissection
approach, this article instead attempts to synthesize the relevant jurisprudence.
At the centre of the analysis is the bedrock principle that the negligence system is
a fault-based system which relies on proving a connection between a defendant's
wrongful behaviour and a plaintiff's injury.

L'auteur avance qu'il n'y a rien qui puisse porter J confusion dans les r~gles
de droit applicables pour d6terminer le lien de causalitd dans les actions en
negligence. I/ tente de ddfinir /'dtat actuel du lien de causalitd dans le domaine
de la negligence en droit canadien en ayant un objectif simple en tate : tenir une
conversation franche et productive sur le droit tout en d6finissant clairement les
concepts fondamentaux.
L'auteur alldgue que si mdme les arr~ts phares en matibre de lien de causalit6
sont souvent r6digis en termes g6ndraux et universels pour eviter de limiter
I'applicabilit6 des concepts, ils peuvent 6tre lus comme faisant partie d'une
continuum ininterrompu de conversations sur le lien de causalitd. // propose un
m6canisme cohdrent en adoptant une perspective longitudinale et en mettant
l'accent sur les th6mes simples du droit canadien de la responsabilit6 civile
ddlictuelle pr~sents dans la jurisprudence sur le lien de causalitd : les critbres
doctrinaux concernant le lien de causalitd, les preuves permettant d'6tablir le
lien de causalit6 et les r'gles de vulndrabilit6 (<<thin skull -, < crumbing skull ).
Evitant de procdder a une analyse exhaustive au cas-par-cas, l'auteur tente plutit
de rdsumer la jurisprudence pertinente. Son analyse tourne autour du principe
qui constitue la cl de vo0te des r~gles de droit en matibre de ndgligence, c'est6-dire que nous sommes face &un rdgime de responsabilitd fondd sur la faute qui
exige la preuve d'un lien entre le comportement fautif de la partie dufenderesse
et le prejudice subi par la partie demanderesse.
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Introduction
There is much confusion about causation in negligence law. Indeed,
causation is the cause of much angst in Canadian legal spheres. Courts
continue to provide what appear, at first glance, impenetrable and
cryptic reasons in answer to the question: "what caused an accident?"
Commentators appear perplexed by the labyrinthine judicial reasoning
and philosophical soup accompanying the question: "what caused an
accident?" And lawyers who are trying to guide their clients through the
tort system must surely be frustrated with all of this when explaining to
their clients "what caused an accident."
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Why does causation cause confusion? Perhaps it is the economy of
language with which the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed this
seemingly challenging topic.' Perhaps it is that the topic itself is laden with
history and philosophical underpinnings which inevitably drag it from
simplicity into complexity.2 Perhaps the doctrinal tools of causationthe "but for" and material contribution tests plus causal inferences-are
deceptively simplistic for the challenging task of adjudging negligent
behaviour in a complex world. Perhaps courts and commentators are taking
a reductionist, hyper-literal meaning of the leading cases on causation and
imbuing the text of the decisions with biblical significance. Perhaps it is
all of this combined.
This article about causation in negligence law is different from past
attempts at unravelling causation. It argues that there is nothing overly
confusing about the law of causation in negligence.' Rather than lament
the confusing state of affairs or argue for a new causation test, the article
attempts to define the current state of causation in Canadian negligence
law with a simple goal in mind-to have a more productive conversation
about the law with the fundamental concepts clearly on the table. Such
clarification should help augment and streamline discussions among
courts, commentators, and lawyers about this seemingly thorny subject.
To date, writings about causation in tort have focused largely on the mess

I. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada's latest case touching on causation, Fullowka v.
Pinkerton of Canada,Inc., 2010 SCC 5, has only five short paragraphs which merely reiterate, nearly
verbatim, the holding in the Supreme Court's decision in Hanke v. Resurfice Corp., 2007 SCC. 7,
[2007] I S.C.R. 333. Hanke itself is a remarkably short judgment, with the causation section being a
very brief 12 paragraphs long.
Much academic discussion at least pays homage to the philosophical explanation of causation by
2.
H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honor6, Causationin the Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959).
A notion echoed by Allan Beever at 327, although he proceeded to argue for a more streamlined
3.
and different two-step causation test. See Allan Beever, "Cause-in-Fact: Two Steps out of the Mire"
(2001) 51 U. T L.J. 327.
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of the entire subject and how so much is confusing and undefined.4 This
article proceeds on the foundation that the leading Canadian cases on
causation should not be read like cryptic advice from isolated fortune
cookies, with each word taking on ominous significance. Although the
language comprising the judgments is often written in broad-based,
universal terminology to refrain from inhibiting conceptual portability,
the cases can be read as a sustained continuum of conversations about
causation.' This article aims to offer a cohesive framework to the law by
taking a longitudinal perspective and focusing on the simple themes of
Canadian tort law present in the causation jurisprudence: the doctrinal tests
for causation, evidence for proving causation, thin skulls, and crumbing
skulls. Avoiding a case-by-case dissection approach, this article instead
aims to synthesize the relevant jurisprudence in a comprehensible way.'

4.
See i.e. Russell Brown, "Material Contribution's Expanding Hegemony: Factual Causation after
Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke" (2007) 45 Can. Bus. L.J. 432; Vaughan Black & David Cheifetz, "Through
the Looking Glass, Darkly: Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke" (2007) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 241; Vaughan Black,
"Decision Causation: Pandora's Tool-Box" in Jason W. Neyers, Erika Chamberlain & Stephen G. A.
Pitel, eds., Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 309; David Cheifetz &
Vaughan Black, "Material Contribution and Quantum Uncertainty: Hanke v. Resurfice Corp." (2006)
43 Can. Bus. L.J. 155; David .Cheifetz, "The Snell Inference and Material Contribution: Defining
the Indefinable and Hunting the Causative Snark" (2005) 30 Advocates' Q. 1; Hillel David, W. Paul
McCague, & Peter F. Yaniszewski, "Proving Causation Where the But For Test is Unworkable" (2005)
30 Advocates' Q. 216; David Cheifetz, "Materially Increasing the Risk of Injury as Factual Cause of
Injury: Fairchildv. Glenhaven FuneralServices Ltd. in Canada" (2004) 29 Advocates' Q. 253; Lewis
Klar, "Downsizing Torts" in Nicholas Mullany & Allen Linden, eds., Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute to John
Fleming (1998) 305 at 311-312; Stephen D. Sugarman, "A New Approach to Tort Doctrine: Taking
the Best from the Civil Law and Common Law of Canada" (2002) 17 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 375; Vaughan
Black, "The Transformation of Causation in the Supreme Court: Dilution and 'Policyization' in Todd
Archibald & Michael Cochrane, eds., Annual Review of Civil Litigation 2002 (Toronto: Carswell,
2002) at 187; Lynda Collins, "Material Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic Torts" (2001)
11 J. Envtl. L. and Prac., 105; Vaughan Black, "A Farewell to Cause: CanadianRed Cross Society v.
Walker Estate" (2001) 24 Advocates' Q. 478; Gillian Demeyere, "The Material Contribution Test: An
Immaterial Contribution to Tort Law: A Comment on Briglio v. Faulkner" (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev.
317; Mitchell McInnes, "Causation in Tort Law: A Decade in the Supreme Court of Canada" (2000)
63 Sask. L. Rev. 445; Mitchell Mclnnes, "Causation in Tort Law: Back to Basics at the Supreme Court
of Canada" (1997) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 1013; and Ernest Weinrib, "A Step Forward in Factual Causation"
(1975) 38 Mod. L. Rev. 518.
5. Here, a frank acknowledgement is due that there indeed appears to be much confusion in lower
courts about basic tort causation doctrine. Some courts appear to apply both a "but for" test and, in the
alternative, a "material contribution" test. (See i.e. Nattrass v. Weber, 2010 ABCA 64, where, had the
plaintiff patient been regularly tested, he would have been given alternative medication). Other courts
disagree on the presence or absence of causal evidence and the ability to make causal inferences. (See
i.e. Barker v. Montfort Hospital, 2007 ONCA 282, 278 D.L.R. (4th) 215; and Aristorenas v. Comcare
Health Services (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 282 (C.A.); both cases with strong dissents). Whether the culprit
of the confusion is the Supreme Court of Canada's economy of language in discussing causation,
the difficulty in tracing consistency in the applicability of various complex causal concepts, or the
sophistry of litigants attempting to apply causation doctrine to a given set of facts, such is not the focus
of this article. Instead, the article is an attempt to weave together with some cohesion the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on causation, with an eye to clarifying the landscape.
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At the centre of the analysis is the bedrock principle that the negligence
system is a fault-based system which relies on proving a connection
between a defendant's wrongful behaviour and a plaintiff's injury.6
I. What is Causation?
This article is concerned primarily with cause-in-fact-the third step in a
standard negligence analysis in tort which links the defendant's breach of
the applicable standard of care with the harm to the victim. A court only
gets to the causation stage of the negligence analysis after the plaintiff has
successfully proven that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care
and the defendant fell below the applicable standard of care. Causation
links the defendant's breach of the requisite standard of care. with the
production of some harm to the plaintiff. Justice Sopinka aptly defined
causation in tort as "an expression of the relationship that must be found
to exist between the tortious act of the wrongdoer and the injury to the
victim in order to justify compensation of the latter out of the pocket of
the former."' The causation step in a negligence case is often the most
contentious, most expensive step. It requires the most evidence, often in
the form of expert evidence. And it is probably the most heated step in
the analysis simply because, in order to arrive at the causation step, the
plaintiff will have already had to prove that the defendant breached the
standard of care. So the plaintiff will have already established fault. The
causation step builds the connection between fault and harm.
II. The "butfor" test is the default test for causation
Despite what past case law may have appeared to suggest, the standard
doctrinal test for causation in a negligence analysis remains the "but for"
test.8 And again, despite what past case law may have appeared to suggest,
this test.works for nearly all factual circumstances. The test requires that
a fact-finder ask: "but for" the defendant's negligent behaviour, would
the plaintiff have suffered some injury? The defendant's negligence only
has to be "a" cause, not "the" sole cause, and there may be other tortious
and non-tortious causes in the mix. 9 This simple test often causes much
confusion because two fundamental aspects of the test are misunderstood.

6. See i.e. Klar, supra note 4 and Lewis Klar "The Role of Fault and Policy in Negligence Law"
(1996) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 24 (both stressing the fundamental nature of the fault-based inquiry in tort
law).
7. Snell v. Farrell,[1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at para. 27.
As affirmed by the Supreme Court in Hanke, supra note 1, and reaffirmed in Fullowka, supra
8.
note 1.
9.
See Blackwater v. Plint, 2005 SCC 58, [2005] 3 SC.R. 3 and Athey v. Leonati [1996] 3 S.C.R.
458.
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They are misunderstood because it is forgotten that tort law is a fault-based
system that relies on establishing a connection between responsibility for
harm on the part of one party (the defendant) and the suffering of that
harm on the part of another party (the plaintiff).10 Courts, commentators,
and litigants would be well-served by constantly keeping this fundamental
purpose in mind.
The first misunderstood aspect of the "but for" test is the fact that
the causal "trigger" (if it can be called such) is the defendant's breach
of the standard of care. So, to put the test in more understandable and
precise terms, it asks: "but for" the defendant's breach of the standard of
care, would the plaintiff have suffered some injury? Clarifying this simple
detail is fundamental to the operation of the test. The "but for" test is not
about discovering what factor really caused the accident, in the real world.
Nor is it about discovering what really happened factually to bring about
the turn of events which resulted in injury. The only purpose the test serves
is to determine the link between the at-fault conduct of the defendant and
the plaintiff's alleged harm caused by that at-fault defendant.
All too often, it is easy to forget that the causation inquiry in negligence
law is not a forensic inquiry into "what happened." Or, one can get distracted
by chasing "but for" causes down an endless chain of events. The only
relevant relationships between causes and harm are those that involve the
defendant's negligent behaviour and the injured plaintiff before the court.
That is why a defendant's breach of the standard of care only needs to be
"a" cause of the plaintiff's injury, and not the sole, independent cause. To
do otherwise is to trace causal events to absurd levels of abstraction, from
the events of the accident to what the defendant had for breakfast and all
the way back to the "primordial slime" out of which humans evolved."
The simple threshold of causal relevance is the defendant's breach of the
standard of care.
An example helps to clarify the basic concepts of "but for" causation.
Imagine Lucy is in a motor vehicle collision with Ethel. Lucy and Ethel
were each driving their own vehicles. Ethel did not stop at a "stop" sign
because she was talking on a cell phone and accidentally drove into
Lucy's vehicle. Lucy was injured. To recover from Ethel in tort, Lucy
must establish that Ethel's breach of the applicable standard of care was a
cause of her injuries. If Lucy was also intoxicated from alcohol at the time
and had also forgotten to wear her prescription glasses she was legally
required to wear to operate her vehicle, the causation question still remains
10. See i.e. Klar (1996), supranote 6.
I1. See Glanville Williams, "Causation in the Law" (1961) 19 Cambridge L.J. 62 at 64.
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the same: "but for" Ethel's breach of the standard of care of a reasonable
driver, would Lucy have suffered some injury in the car accident? The "but
for" test does not switch to some other inquiry about "what happened to
make this mess?" Even though there may be other causal factors at work,
each operating to create an end result injury (i.e., the intoxication and
the poor eyesight), the "but for" test remains steadfastly focused on the
wrongful conduct of the at-fault tortfeasor. Is it Ethel's fault that resulted
in some harm to Lucy?
The second often misunderstood element of the "but for" test is the fact
that the injury in question must be the result of the defendant's conduct.
This seems simple enough but, in a complex, multi-causal situation, can
become confusing. The at-fault defendant is only being held responsible
in tort law for the injury caused by her behaviour. 2 The defendant is not
being held responsible for the fact that the accident merely happened.
There is a significant difference between the "happening" of an event and
the causing of an injury which is, in itself, just the result of a "happening."
Tort law is only concerned with the result of the happening-the injury.
In the example above, the question must be focused on whether or not,
regardless of other potential causes of harm intermingled in the happening,
Ethel's breach of the standard of care is "a" cause of "some" harm. Even if
Lucy's drunkenness and her failure to wear her glasses also contributed to
the end result injuries she suffered, if Lucy can prove that Ethel's breach of
the standard of care resulted in "some" injury to Lucy, she has proven "but
for" causation." In this example, "but for" Ethel's at-fault behaviour, Lucy
would not have been injured. This is so because the negligence system is
only concerned with fault-based liability.
Time and again, the Supreme Court of Canada has re-affirmed that
the "but for" test is the default test to apply when faced with determining
causation. 4 Arguably, and despite much commentary to the contrary, 5 this
test works for the vast majority of tort cases. There is typically no reason

12. Athey, supra note 9.
13. The intoxication and failure to wear glasses are dealt with using contributory negligence
principles, after Lucy has proven the tort against Ethel.
14. See i.e. Snell, supra note 7; Athey, supra note 9; Walker Estate v. York-Finch General Hospital,
2001 SCC 23, [2001] I S.C.R. 647; Blackwater supra note 9; Hanke, supra note 1; and Fullowka,
supra note 1.
15. See i.e. Black & Cheifetz (2007), supra note 4; Cheifetz & Black (2006), supra note 4; Cheifetz,
supra note 4; David, McCague & Yaniszewski, supra note 4; Black (2002), supra note 4 at 187;
Beever, supra note 3; Black (2001), supra note 4; Demeyere, supra note 4; McInnes (2000), supra
note 4; McInnes (1997), supra note 4; and Weinrib, supra note 4.
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to reach for any novel doctrinal causation tool.' 6 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has said as much in Hanke v. Resurfice and again in Fullowka.II One
primary reason this Court may have had to repeatedly remind the legal
world that the bedrock test for causation is "but for" is simply because
lower courts have often confused the utility of the test with the ease of
operation of the alternative test for causation in Canada: the material
contribution test. That test is reserved only for instances where the "but
for" test is "unworkable."'"
And therein lies the problem. "Unworkable". is in the eye of the
beholder. Whenever a court had a challenging causation issue, it was simply
too easy to reach for the material contribution test and find causation.
Commentators have consistently lamented the fact that the Supreme Court
has offered little guidance as to when the "but for" test is "unworkable"
and when to use the material contribution test. 19 However, the Supreme
Court arguably did just that in Hanke.
III. The materialcontribution test: the rare exception
There is actually some discernible judicial guidance about how and when
to use the material contribution test to prove causation in negligence. One
just has to start with the premise that the "but for" test is the default test
and the material contribution test is the exceedingly rare exception to
"but for."20 It is reserved only for those instances where proving "but for"
causation results in some logical impossibility that is obviously incorrect
or unjust in a fault-based tort system.
The material contribution test is the doctrinal test to use when "but
for" causation is "unworkable." 2 ' The test is simple in operation, and there
22
are two remarkably stringent pre-conditions to the application of the test.

16. Such as: (a) the material contribution test from Hanke, supra note 1; (b) reversing the burden
of proof to the defendant to disprove causation (as was the case in McGhee v.National Coal Board,
[1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.) and its short-lived Canadian progeny such as Nowsco Well Service
Ltd v. Canadian Propane Gas and Oil Ltd., [1981] 7 Sask. R. 291 (C.A.) and Letnik v. Toronto,
(Municipality of Metropolitan), [1988] 2 F.C. 399 (Fed. CA)); or (c) holding the defendant responsible
for risk increase alone (see i.e. Lynda Collins, "Material Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic
Torts" (2001) 11 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 105 and David Gerecke, "Risk Exposure as Injury: Alleviating
the Injustice of Tort Causation Rules" (1990) 35 McGill L.J. 797.
17. Hanke, supra note 1.
18. See Athey, supra note 9: Walker. supra note 14; Hanke, supra note 1; and Fulloiwka, supra note
1.
19. See i.e. Brown, supra note 4; Black & Cheifetz (2007), supra note 4; Cheifetz & Black, supra
note 4; and Hillel, McCague & Yaniszewski, supra note 4.
20. As has been consistently repeated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Athey, supra note 9;
Walker, supra note 14; Hanke, supra note 1; and Fullowka, supra note I.
21. What is, or is not, "unworkable" will be discussed in more detail below.
22. From the Supreme Court's decision in Hanke, supra note 1.

Clarifying Causation. in Tort

161

First, it must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove causation under the
"but for" test. This impossibility must be something beyond the plaintiff's
control. The Supreme Court gives the notion of "current limits of scientific
knowledge" as one reason for the impossibility. Another, implied from the
Supreme Court's discussion in Hanke of the Cook v. Lewis23 example,24
appears to be when it may be practically impossible to apply the "but
for" test because of the particular facts of the happening (i.e., two hunters
negligently shoot at once, but it is impossible to tell which one's birdshot
strikes an incorrect target and injures someone). The plaintiff is unable to
prove "but for" causation because of the inherent nature of the peculiar
happening here, not because the plaintiff could obtain sufficient evidence
in the circumstances but merely did not. The impossibility is thus beyond
the plaintiff's control.25
The second pre-condition for the material contribution test is that the
plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant breached the standard of
care, exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff
must have suffered that type of injury.26 Note that the pre-condition still
requires a finding of fault on the part of the defendant-the defendant must
have conducted herself below the accepted standard for that particular
type of behaviour.
If both of these pre-conditions are met, a court can apply the material
contribution test for causation. That test operates as follows: as long as
the plaintiff can prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant's

23. [1951] S.C.R. 830.
24. It is important to note here that it appears the Supreme Court of Canada was using only the
factual backdrop of the Cook v. Lewis case as a hypothetical factual basis for explaining potential
problems with using "but for" causation. The Court did not discuss the merits of the specific holding
in that case nor the actual result of the case.
25. There is nothing more the injured plaintiff-or anyone in that circumstance at the time-could
do in Cook v. Lewis to prove "but for" causation. Evidence of causation was not merely deficient or
even absent: it was unobtainable at that time in history. The Plaintiff did not offer evidence to prove
causation because the peculiar circumstances of the negligence of the parties meant he could not get
it. The Plaintiff cannot sensibly provide an answer to the "but for" causation question: "'but for' the
negligence of Hunter A, would the victim have suffered some harm?" The answer is an unsatisfactory:
"I don't know, because of the simultaneous negligence of Hunter B and the particular indivisible
mechanics of the acts of Hunters A and B." One could suppose that there is an alternative result:
a finding of no liability on either hunter. But the Supreme Court in Cook v. Lewis did not hold as
such. By using the same factual backdrop to describe instances where the standard "but for" test is
unworkable and the pro-plaintiff material contribution test can instead be utilized, the Supreme Court
in Hanke appears to approve of placing the cost of accidents on those tortfeasors, like the hunters,
who have breached the standard of care and whose conduct was such that the plaintiff cannot prove
causation through no fault of his or her own.
26. Hanke, supra note 1.

162 The Dalhousie Law Journal

breach of the standard of care materially contributed to the plaintiff's
injury beyond the de minimis range, causation is proven. 27
The point to emphasize is that the use of material contribution as a
doctrinal test for causation is severely restricted and rare. "But for" will
almost always work to answer the causation question about a particular
case, and the answer depends upon the sufficiency of the evidence. The
material contribution test has nothing to do with the number of potential
causes, the complexity of the case, the number of parties, pre-existing
conditions, crumbling or thin skulls, or anything other than the defendant's
breach of the standard of care in relation to the plaintiff's resulting injury.
But the problem with the material contribution test is that it usually works
in favour of the plaintiff. One can almost always find causation against
the defendant whose behaviour increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff.
In essence, material contribution has the potential to create liability for
breach of a standard of care plus risk creation.28
Perhaps there is nothing wrong with that. Perhaps more than any
other doctrinal tool, material contribution gets closer to working justice in
that small subset of cases where appropriate. Jane Stapleton has recently
argued that causation in negligence is plagued with problems largely for
structural reasons of the concept itself-there is no way to communicate
cause other than in a dyadic, all-or-nothing fashion-either a defendant's
negligence is a cause of harm or it is not.2 9 She proposes that causation
instead be examined in terms of causal "involvement" of the defendant's
negligence, with that negligence being one factor in a complex set of
events. Measuring and assessing "involvement" on a causal continuum
instead of a reductionist cause/no cause arbitrariness perhaps gets closer
to the factual truth when one is faced with an already negligent defendant
whose negligence is but one cause in a realistic panoply of possible causes,
both tortious and non-tortious. The Supreme Court's approach to material
contribution, with its emphasis on fault-centred risk creation, gets closer
to Stapleton's notion of involvement as a solution to logically impossible
causation cases like circular and dependency causation cases.

27. A they, supra note 9; Walker supra note 14; Hanke, supranote 1; and Fullowka, supra note 1.
28. The author has also previously argued for the same structured approach to causation the Supreme
Court eventually took in Hanke, supra note 1, in cases where causation is ambiguous. See Erik S.
Knutsen, "Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A Multi-Jurisdicitonal Approach"
(2003) 38 Tex. Int'l L.J. 249.
29. See Jane Stapleton, "Choosing What We Mean By 'Causation' In the Law" (2008) 73 Mo. L.
Rev. 433.
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IV. When is "butfor" unworkable? Circularand dependency causation
1. Examples of "but for" unworkability
The Supreme Court in Hanke provides two examples of when "but for"
is "unworkable" and it is therefore permissible to resort to the material
contribution test. The first is the Cook v. Lewis "circular causation"
situation, where it is impossible to tell which of two potential tortious
sources caused the harm to the plaintiff. In Cook v. Lewis, two hunters
simultaneously negligently shot at what they thought was a bird. Instead,
one hunter's birdshot struck a third person. It was impossible to tell what
shot came from which gun. Even modem forensic ballistic science would
be hard-pressed to identify from which firearm the shot pellets came,
assuming the same shot size was used by each hunter. Hence, there is a
real limit to the scientific knowledge for uncovering causation. The "but
for" test leads to an absurd result in this case, knowing at the very least that
both hunters are at fault. One asks "but for the negligent shooting of hunter
A, would the plaintiff have been injured?" The response is unknowable
because of the actions of hunter B. One would respond "perhaps, because
hunter B may have been the one whose shot struck the plaintiff." When
one then returns the question about hunter B, one gets the same circular
response: "but for the negligent shooting of hunter B, would the plaintiff
have been injured?" One would respond "perhaps, because it may really
have been hunter A whose shot struck the plaintiff."
The causal response is circular because the plaintiff knows that one of
either hunter A or B was a cause of the harm, and one of either hunter A
or B was not but, because causal analysis only accommodates focusing on
one hunter at a time, the result is the unsatisfactory answer: "impossible
to tell without knowing the answer for the other potential tortfeasor."
Both hunters were at fault, and it is obvious one hunter's shot connected
with the plaintiff and resulted in some harm. If not for both hunters acting
negligently and shooting at once, the plaintiff would not be in such an
impossible circular proof position. In a "one hunter" scenario, the answer
is simple: liability for that hunter. But in the "two hunter" scenario where
only one hunter's birdshot connects yet each is just as negligent as the other,
it makes little sense for the causation answer of "impossible to tell" to lead
to a finding of no liability when the victim was certainly shot by one of the
two negligent hunters. The key to identifying a circular causation situation
is that there is nothing the plaintiff can do to adduce evidence pointing
more to one causal source than the other. The evidentiary frustration is
one about identity of the causal source. It is not that there was merely not
enough evidence adduced to prove identity. There must be no evidence
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available to prove identity because of the unique circumstances of the
case. This evidentiary stalemate is not the fault of the plaintiff-proof is
merely unobtainable due to how the accident happened.
The Supreme Court's words in Hanke are likely trying to express
that, in instances where there is complete circular logic which makes the
"but for" test unanswerable, like in cases where it is impossible to prove
which one of two or more tortious sources caused the plaintiff's injury,
one can reach for the material contribution test to find causation. It is a
question not of "how much" but of "which one." The Supreme Court is
not saying, however, that the material contribution test applies to any case
where there is more than one tortfeasor. That was the mistake previous
courts kept committing. Rare is the case where a fact scenario with
multiple tortfeasors requires the material contribution test. McLachlin
C.J.C.'s example of Cook v. Lewis is likely trying to communicate that,
in instances of "circular causation," where the "but for" test produces an
endless circular answer that is unsatisfactory because one potential causal
source is certainly a cause of harm, one can use the material contribution
test as long as both pre-conditions are met.
The second example in Hanke where the material contribution test
is suitable to use involves a chain of multi-party actions, each depending
on the other, in a situation of "dependency causation." The "but for"
test may be impossible to prove when one must determine what a party
would have done had the defendant not been negligent, and thus how that
party's decision affects the plaintiff's resulting injury. The example the
Court gives is Walker v. York Finch Hospital," a case where it may have
been impossible to prove "but for" causation." In that case, it may have
been impossible to prove that, but for the negligent screening of blood
donors by the defendant blood collection service, a person with HIVinfected blood may not have donated the infected blood which eventually
injured the plaintiff. The causal link between the at-fault defendant and
the injured plaintiff is thus mediated by the action of a third party. This
"dependency causation" necessarily relies on evidence of causation
beyond the relationship between the at-fault defendant and the injured
plaintiff, and is potentially very difficult to obtain.

30. Walker, supra note 14.
3 1. In fact, the Court was able to find "but for" causation in this case because there was evidence
from the donor to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the blood donor would not have donated
blood had the defendant properly implemented screening procedures.
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An example of a third case not mentioned in Hanken which does pass
the two pre-conditions to the material contribution test is the House of Lords
case of Fairchildv. Glenhaven FuneralHome." This is a case of circular
causation, where the plaintiff ran up against an impossibility with the "but
for" test because of multiple potential tortious causes and an inability to
prove which of the tortious causes (all negligent defendants) was a cause
of his injuries. The plaintiff worked at multiple asbestos operations over
a period of time. He contracted mesothelioma. This disease can be caused
by the inhaling of one single fibre of asbestos. The employers all breached
the applicable standard of care in keeping unsafe work environments.
The plaintiff could not prove "but for" one employer, he would not have
suffered some injury. There were multiple negligent employers and it was
impossible, based on current scientific limits, to prove at which employer
he inhaled the asbestos fibre. Proof was beyond the plaintiff's control, but
the plaintiff knew he inhaled the asbestos at one of the potential tortious
employers. Again, because the causal analysis is structured to focus on
one tortfeasor at a time, this scenario also leads to circular causation
responses. The plaintiff, however, could prove breach of the standard of
care, exposure to risk, and the fact that he contracted the very disease
foreseeable by exposure to the ambit of such risk. Thus, in Canada, this
type of case fits with the application of the material contribution test. In
Britain, the House of Lords adopted a modified version of.the test, holding
that exposure to risk was sufficient proof of causation in this special case
of mesothelioma. 34
Another example from the Supreme Court of Canada is a hypothetical
from the facts of Athey v. Leonati.3 1 In that case, the plaintiff suffered
two separate car accidents and then later experienced a disc herniation
while doing mild exercise. He also had pre-existing degenerative disc
disease. Major J. indicated that if either of the accidents alone, or the preexisting back condition alone, were sufficient to cause the ultimate disc
herniation, and there was no evidence indicating one potential cause was
more likely the cause than the other, then the application of the material

32. But which generated considerable academic interest. See i.e. Jane Stapleton, "Lords a'Leaping
Evidentiary Gaps" (2002) 10 Tort L.J. 276 and Cheifetz, supra note 4.
33. Fairchildv. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd., [2002] 1 UKHL 22.
34. The concept has since been expanded to apply in England to a case where the plaintiff's injury
from asbestos dust could have from one of three potential causes-either of two negligent employers
(both tortious causes) or the plaintiffs own contributory negligence when he exposed himself to
asbestos dust at work (a non-tortious cause). See Barker v. Carus, [2006] UKHL 20.
35. Athey, supra note 9.
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contribution test would have been appropriate.3 6 This would be a case
of circular causation, where it is impossible to tell which of the equally
plausible but mutually exclusive potential causes are a cause of the loss.
It is no different than the Cook v. Lewis scenario described in Hanke. Two
potential tortious causes-two accidents-plus a non-tortious cause-the
pre-existing condition-would all be equal candidates for being a cause
of the plaintiff's ultimate injury. The key here is that the hypothetical
presumes that each cause alone may have been sufficient to cause the
harm. It is a question not of "how much" but of "which one." The problem
is that, without definitive evidence on a balance of probabilities of one
of the three causes being a more likely cause, the "but for" test becomes
circular. It is equally either this cause or that cause or the other cause, but
not all three.
The "but for" test thus appears to be unworkable in instances of
circular causation and dependency causation. Both of these types of
causation situations are beyond the plaintiff's control-they just happen.
They therefore fit the first pre-condition. Neither scientific information nor
anything within the plaintiff's control can assist in either solving which
hunter shot the plaintiff or what a third party blood donor may or may not
have done had a blood agency properly informed its donors.
The second pre-condition in Hanke cements the fault-based causal
connection that is central to tort law. It avoids the unfortunate result of
finding parties liable when there is no wrongdoing on the part of the party.
There must at least be fault-breach of a standard of care. The second
pre-condition requires a showing of a breach of the applicable standard
of care, and exposure to some risk, with the foreseeable injury resulting.
Each example above matches this pre-condition. The hunters in Cook v.
Lewis both breached the standard of care of a reasonable hunter in firing in
the vicinity of an unsafe target. These breaches increased the risk of being
shot, and the plaintiff was shot. In the Walker example, the blood agency
breached the applicable standard of care of a reasonable blood agency by
not properly screening and informing its donors. "But for" appears to fail
in instances of circular and dependency causation, two admittedly rare
factual circumstances. But is that the limit of material contribution?. If so,
it is a very restricted test. The answer lies in an examination of when the
"but for" test does work.

36. In the case itself, the evidence adduced proved that it was necessary to have both the accidents
and the pre-existing condition for the ultimate disc herniation to occur. The herniation would not have
occurred "but for" the accidents happening as well. See Athey, supra note 9 at para. 41.
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2. When "butfor" works
To discern when "but for" is unworkable, it is strangely revelatory to learn
that the Supreme Court jurisprudence about the material contribution test
never actually applies the test.37 It is also strangely revelatory to learn just
how often "but for" works. This can only mean that the material contribution
test is quite rare and truly reserved for practicalfproof impossibilities like
circular causation and dependency causation. By proceeding with that
concept in mind, the jurisprudence about causation becomes that much
more clear.
a. Sufficient evidence
"But for" works when there is enough evidence to prove, on a balance
of probabilities, that the defendant's breach of the standard of care was
a cause of the plaintiff's injury. The reverse is also true. "But for" works
when there is insufficient evidence to prove, on a balance of probabilities,
that the defendant's breach of the standard of care was not a cause of the
plaintiff's injury. The logical answer, whether in favour of the plaintiff
or defendant, is usually the result. The material contribution test is not a
solution for evidentiary insufficiency. Plaintiffs must still prove causation
on a balance of probabilities. The only instances "but for" does not work
are in instances where there is insufficient evidence to prove "but for"
causation and there is either circular or dependency causation.
The Walker v. York Finch Hospital example fits this pattern. Recall
that this was the factual example that the Supreme Court in Hanke cited as
a possible situation where the material contribution test would be suitable
to apply. But, in this specific case, there was actual evidence from the
blood donor which established, on a balance of probabilities, that the blood
donor in this case would not have donated blood had he been sufficiently
warned by the negligent blood agency. There was no need, in this specific
case, to reach for the material contribution test. "But for" was satisfied as
follows: "but for" the negligent blood agency's failure to warn the donor,
the donor would not have donated infected blood and the plaintiff would
not have been injured. The case would be markedly different if there was
no evidence from the donor at all. Assume the donor was unavailable as a
witness. This would create a situation of dependency causation, because
it would not be the plaintiff's fault that the donor-a non-party to the
lawsuit-was unavailable to testify what he would have done had he been
properly warned. "But for" breaks down. "But for" the blood agency's

37. The "but for" test was applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in Snell, supra note 7; Athey,
supra note 9; Walker, supranote 14; Blackwater,supra note 9; and Hanke, supra note 1.
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negligence, it is unknowable as to what the donor would have done.
Material contribution is an appropriate test here to fill in the causative
gap. Otherwise, the "but for" test is suitable for all instances where there
is enough evidence to prove causation on a balance of probabilities.
While that seems obvious, the concept often explains why courts find
the causation issue in favour of defendants: the defendant successfully
rebutted the plaintiff's causation evidence on a balance of probabilities.
b. Multiple negligentparties
"But for" also works when there are multiple negligent parties. Merely
adding more negligent characters to the torts story does not attract use of
the material contribution test, whether or not each may have separately, or
in conjunction, harmed the plaintiff. The only time "but for" fails is in the
circular causation scenario where there are multiple exclusive potential
tortious causes of an injury and the plaintiff, through no fault of her own,
cannot prove which one of the causes was "a" cause. If multiple defendants
all potentially harm the plaintiff, a court can perform a "but for" test on
each negligent actor.
c. Multiple potentialcauses
Cases involving multiple potential causes, whether tortious or nontortious, nearly always satisfy the. "but for" test unless there is a contest
of mutually exclusive potential causes which results in circular causation,
as in the Cook v. Lewis example in Hanke, or unless there is dependency
causation, as in Walker. There are nearly always multiple potential causes
for any plaintiff's injury. Sometimes the causes are the results of negligent
behaviour, as described in the section above. Sometimes the causes are
unrelated to the negligence of the defendants but occurring in nature or
internally within the plaintiff. Sometimes there is a combination of these
two classes of causes. Regardless, the "but for" test is adequate unless one
of the two exceptions in Hanke appears in the causal matrix. The answer to
the "but for" question most often rests not on causation but on evidentiary
sufficiency and the plaintiff's ability to prove causation on a balance of
probabilities.
Take Snell v. Farrellas an example of a case involving two potential
causes of a plaintiff's injury. Dr. Farrell negligently performed an
operation on Mrs. Snell's eye by continuing the operation despite noticing
some bleeding. Mrs. Snell was a diabetic and prone to vascular problems.
At some point between while Dr. Farrell was negligently operating on
Mrs. Snell's eye and a subsequent follow-up appointment months later,
Mrs. Snell suffered a stroke at the back of her eye and went blind. It was
impossible for Mrs. Snell to prove on a balance of probabilities that Dr.
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Farrell's breach of the standard of care was a cause of her injury. There
was the other competing cause-the stroke. That, too, could have been a
cause of her injury. The "but for" test here still works but the problem is an
evidentiary one, not something wrong with the doctrinal test for causation.
It is important to note that the focus of the inquiry is not on whether or
not, but for the diabetic stroke, would Mrs. Snell have been blinded. The
inquiry is only focused on the negligent behaviour as a cause of Mrs.
Snell's injuries. The stroke was not on trial. Dr. Farrell was.
The Supreme Court's solution, as discussed in greater detail below,
was to allow an inference of causation as long as Mrs. Snell could adduce
some evidence implicating Dr. Farrell's negligence as a possible cause of
her harm. This inference is nothing more than an evidentiary short-cut to
proving standard "but for" causation. As "but for" causation requires proof
on a balance of probabilities, the inference gets the plaintiff from "some
evidence" to "sufficient evidence." Of course, a defendant is free to rebut
the inference with competing evidence.
The point here is that, even in cases of multiple potential causes,
whether tortious or non-tortious, the "but for" test can answer the causal
question. Issues of evidentiary sufficiency are just that-they are not
indicative of problems with the "but for" test itself.
d. Successive and cumulative injuries
Successive and cumulative injury cases, including those involving preexisting conditions, can also satisfactorily meet the "but for" test. The test
becomes more a question of sufficiency of proof and damages than one of
causation. For example, in the Athey case, there was evidence that both
successive accidents plus the pre-existing degenerative disc disease were
necessary conditions for the ultimate disc herniation to occur. However,
if it were the case that accident #1 caused some damage to the plaintiff,
accident #2 some additional damage, and the pre-existing condition itself
would have eventually led to the disc herniation, the tort concepts of
restoration and responsibility act as gatekeepers on liability, not the law
of causation. Tort law is designed to put the plaintiff back in the position
he was in before the tort. Furthermore, negligent defendants are only
responsible for the harm their negligence caused, no more and no less.
"But for" operates just fine when one recalls that the defendant's
negligence need only be "a" cause, not "the" cause. "But for" the defendant's
negligence in accident #1, the plaintiff would not have experienced "some"
injury. Causation is proven for defendant #1. "But for" the defendant's
negligence in accident #2, the plaintiff would not have experienced "some"
additional injury. Causation is proven for defendant #2. The fact that each
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defendant would be responsible to pay for only what damages he caused is
a damages question. It is not a causation question. Each defendant caused
some injury to the plaintiff. The particular damages each caused are sorted
out as contributions in the damages phase of the inquiry. Causation itself
is never divisible because defendants' negligence need only be "a" cause
of "some" harm. Only damages doctrine allows rateable proportions of
responsibility to pay for harm.
As for the pre-existing condition, the same principle applies. If the
plaintiff would have been in the same injured state as a result of his preexisting condition at some point in the future, that consideration is left
for the damages phase. This is the crumbling skull doctrine, discussed
more fully below. It is not an appropriate inquiry at the causation phase for
one simple reason: the pre-existing condition is not on trial. The negligent
defendants are. Tort is concerned with linking fault-based behaviour with
harm. The pre-existing condition cannot be a negligence-based cause. It has
no fault but is internal to the plaintiff. Its impact is taken into consideration
at the damages phase, as a contingency, where the defendants'proportional
responsibility to pay for the plaintiff's ultimate harm is reduced because
the plaintiff would have suffered the harm at some point, without the
involvement of the defendants' negligent behaviour.
"But for" causation is therefore not complicated in successive or
cumulative injury contexts when one focuses solely on each actor and each
actor's role in the causal story. The confusion results when one forgets two
things: first, that it is a defendant's breach of the standard of care that is
the locus of the causal inquiry, and second, that a defendant's negligence
need only be proven to be "a" cause of "some" injury to the plaintiff.
The damages phase of the negligence inquiry does. the work of sorting
out responsibility among potential causes, whether separated by time and
space or by actor or by internal causes. It does so by adhering to the tort
principles of restoration and responsibility. Causation is not affected.
e. No breach of the standardof care
This is somewhat of an obvious ringer category, but deserving of mention.
One cannot have a "but for" causal inquiry if the defendant did not first
breach the applicable standard of care. This was the case in Hanke.
Causation is reliant first on proof of fault on the part of the defendant.
Absent that wrongdoing, one never gets to the causal analysis.
In Hanke, the manufacturer of the ice-resurfacing machine was
found to have adhered to the applicable standard of care in designing the
spigots with which one refuelled and re-watered the machine. When the
operator tried to put fuel into the water spout and the machine exploded,
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the ultimate resulting injury was not the consequence of any negligent
behaviour on the part of the machine manufacturer. There was no breach
of the standard of care to complete the "but for" inquiry. It could be said
that, for real-world but not for tort purposes, the accident was "caused" by
something other than the negligence of the defendant. In this case, the sole
cause of the accident was the negligence of the plaintiff (i.e., the plaintiff
was 100% contributorily negligent). To prove the initial tort, the "but for"
test does not inquire about any other factor as causative other than the
defendant's breach of the standard of care. Hence, no breach means no
causation. So the "but for" test is entirely workable in situations where the
defendant did not breach the applicable standard of care or, alternatively,
where the plaintiff is 100% contributorily negligent because the causation
step cannot be proven without breach of the standard of care from the
defendant. This proves that the defendant's negligence could never have
been "a" cause.
3. A note on "currentlimits ofscientific knowledge"
The Supreme Court's noting in Hanke of "current limits of scientific
knowledge" as one possible reason for "but for" causation being beyond
the reach of the plaintiff to prove requires some clarification. The statement
must be read in the context of what the Supreme Court was trying to
say: in order to depart from the standard "but for" test, the test must be
unworkable for circular or dependency causation reasons, neither of which
is the fault of the plaintiff.
"Current limits of scientific knowledge" should not be read out. of
context to mean that the material contribution test is appropriate in any case
where the science involved is difficult, complex, or "just not there yet."
Frankly, that is just about any case where personal injury is involved. The
science of medicine as it relates to the interaction of disease, medication,
and trauma on the body is more of an art than a science. It is constantly
evolving. Indeed, one might argue it will always have current limits that
soon get eclipsed by future, unknowable limits. But the Supreme Court's
statement is nothing more than an example of one reason why there may
be a logical impossibility in proving causation with the "but for" test. It is
an explanatory reason, so to speak, for the existence of circular causation.
It is not a reason to turn to the material contribution test. It is certainly not
a gatekeeper for the material contribution test. The gatekeeping function
is met by the two pre-conditions which must be satisfied in instances of
circular or dependency causation.
The Cook v. Lewis and Fairchildexamples solidify this interpretation
about the limits of science. In 1951, the current limits of scientific
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knowledge were (and arguably today are still) such that no one could
tell definitively which pellets came from which shotgun. Hence, there
was circular causation as to which of the two defendants was a cause
of the plaintiff's harm. The material contribution test was therefore the
appropriate test. The limits on science are not the excuse for the test but
merely an explanatory reason for the circular causation problem-it is not
within the accident victim's control that no ballistics science can deduce
from which shotgun came which pellet. If however, each hunter in the
case were instead using rifles and firing bullets as ammunition instead of
using shotguns and firing pellets as ammunition, modem ballistic tests can
identify the firearm from which one single projectile bullet was shot. In
that instance, causation would not be beyond current limits of scientific
knowledge and the "but for" test works.
In Fairchild, the current limits of scientific knowledge prevented
one from knowing from which employer the single asbestos fibre came.
Again, the limits of science are not causative of the logical impossibility,
but merely the explanatory reason for its current existence.
To apply the material contribution test, one must first have either a
situation of circular or dependency causation. These situations may change
over time, as the world gets increasingly complex or, inversely, increasingly
explainable by science. Causal information is not static from case to case
as science can simultaneously allow more or less reliable information into
evidence. The point of including "current limits of scientific knowledge"
as a possible reason for resulting circular or dependency causation was
merely to signify to litigants that proof potential changes as knowledge in
the world changes. But the doctrinal tests for causation remain the same.
The material contribution test is thus the judicial loophole designed
for those particularly strange and difficult cases where everyone knows
that to deny the plaintiff the ability to prove the tort based on causation,
in the wake of solid evidence of negligent behaviour on the part of the
defendant, is just plain wrong. The Supreme Court in Hanke has set up
some important pre-conditions to the test. There must be first a logical
impossibility in proving "but for" causation. The examples given by the
Supreme Court include both circular causation and dependency causation.
Perhaps there may be more. But these are the present examples. Second,
the plaintiff must prove breach of the standard of care (which is nothing
new), plus the fact that the breach exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable
risk of injury and the plaintiff suffered such an injury.
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V. Causationand evidentiary sufficiency
As has already been mentioned, one great source of confusion about the
law of causation in Canada likely comes from the fact that much of the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on causation have really not been about
altering traditional legal doctrine but instead about explaining evidentiary
sufficiency-what it takes to prove causation. This was implicit in Hanke,
Athey, and Walker, as each of those cases proceeded with the "but for"
test, each re-affirmed the "but for" test as the default causation test, and
each had sufficient evidence to determine "but for" causation on a balance
of probabilities." Canada's most influential case about causation, Snell
v. Farrell,is really an evidentiary roadmap for causal proof in situations
where rigidity does no more than complicate things. It does not alter
the standard "but for" test nor does it require anything less than proof
of causation on a balance of probabilities. What the case does is target
evidentiary sufficiency in real-world litigation.
1. "Robust andpragmatic" causal inferences: the causal draw
The Supreme Court in Snell v. Farrellset rules for dealing with causal proof
problems. These rules still operate under the principle that there must be a
fault-based causal inquiry and such inquiry requires proof on a balance of
probabilities. The proof level was not altered, nor was the requirement for
a finding of fault. In Snell, physician Dr. Farrell negligently performed an
operation on Mrs. Snell's eye. At some point during or after the operation,
Mrs. Snell suffered a stroke which may have resulted from her prior diabetic
condition. Mrs. Snell became blind. Mrs. Snell could not.muster enough
evidence to determine that, of the two potential causes-the negligence
of Dr. Farrell (the tortious cause) or the pre-existing condition (the nontortious cause)-it was more likely than not Dr. Farrell's negligence that
resulted in her blindness. Cause here was ambiguous.3 1 What Mrs. Snell
did have was some evidence that Dr. Farrell's negligence could have been
a cause of her injury. This point is key.
Justice Sopinka wrote that, as long as a litigant can muster "very
little affirmative evidence"40 implicating the defendant's breach of the
applicable standard of care as a cause of the plaintiff's injury, a court
was entitled to draw a causal inference as against that defendant. That

38.

In Athey, supra note 9 and Walker supra note 14 causation was proven; in Hanke, supra note I

it was not.

39. The author has elsewhere defined an "ambiguous cause" as one in which two or more alternative
causes are present, and there is insufficient evidence to definitively prove which of two causes was a
cause of the plaintiff's injury. See Knutsen, supranote 28.
40. Snell, supra note 7 at para. 3 1.
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inference can certainly be rebutted by evidence from the defendant, at any
point.4 What the inference does is bump up the plaintiff's level of proof
from something less than sufficient (less than a balance of probabilities) to
something sufficient (the level of a balance of probabilities). The process
involves viewing the evidence with real-world common sense and taking a
"robust and pragmatic approach to the facts." 42 In Snell, in the presence of
possible evidence of both potential causes but in the absence of evidence
definitively pointing to one or the other, the Court inferred that Dr. Farrell's
breach of the standard of care was a cause of Mrs. Snell's blindness. Justice
Sopinka noted that, in cases such as medical malpractice, causation need
not be proven "with scientific precision" 43 to get to a sufficiency level
adequate to prove causation. The causal inference does the work, in the
absence of other competing evidence about causation which might rise to
the balance of probabilities sufficiency.44
What this case does, then, is assist plaintiffs with evidentiary issues in
proving causation. The "robust and pragmatic approach" is not in and of
itself a doctrinal causation test. Nor is the causal inference made about the
evidence a doctrinal causation test. All these two techniques do is assist
with augmenting an evidentiary foundation that has already been laid to
some degree. In the absence of causal evidence pointing to one cause or
another, courts are entitled to pin causation on the negligent cause, but
only if there is no defence evidence on a balance of probabilities proving
otherwise. Courts have, in the past, used causal inferences and the robust
and pragmatic approach to the facts to fudge all kinds of conclusions
about causation. In fact, the approach has become a bit of a causal wildcard. That was not its purpose. It does not magically produce causation
where no evidence exists. It also does not assist the plaintiff in overcoming
proof burdens in the face of evidence countering a favourable causation
finding. Nor does it simplify a difficult causation case by circumventing
the "but for" test and replacing it with an inference of causation. All it
does is augment some evidence about causation to the level of a balance
of probabilities, as long as there is not other competing evidence that is
of a greater level of proof sufficiency, and as long as such augmentation
accords with common sense.
41. And, of course, any defendant is utterly incentivized to do so.
42. Snell, supra note 7 at para. 34.
43. Ibid. at para. 40.
44. For an insightful analysis about the inference approach in Snell and how that approach plays out
against issues of evidentiary sufficiency, see Russell Brown, "The Possibility of 'Inference Causation':
Inferring Cause-in-Fact and the Nature of Legal Fact-Finding" (2010) 55 McGill L.J. I (emphasizing
that an informed approach to "inference causation" can be gained not just from causation theory but
from evidence theory).
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The spirit of Snell v. Farrellwas to be a plaintiff-friendly assist in
proving difficult causation cases in the face of inconclusive evidence.
That is why the nods to common sense and the distancing from scientific
precision are there. A causal inference is no more than an educated guess
taking all the circumstances of the case together. The Supreme Court's
references to common sense and science are to remind other courts that
this guess need not be hampered by overly rigid applications of logic or
proof principles if doing so leads to absurd or troubling results. It is also
a message to plaintiffs that the law of negligence does not require of them
evidentiary proof to such a degree that plaintiffs must disprove causation.
The causal inference assists with the plaintiff's proof of negligence as a
cause of the injury. The defendant is left to his or her own devices to rebut
the plaintiff's evidence with proof of other, non-tortious causes that are
more likely than not a cause of the injury.
In Snell, for example, Mrs. Snell did not have to scientifically prove
that her diabetic condition was not the cause of her stroke. Indeed, she
could not likely prove as such. The focus of the inquiry is the at-fault
conduct of Dr. Farrell. Mrs. Snell also did not have to scientifically prove
that Dr. Farrell's negligence was the only cause of her injury. All she
required was "very little affirmative evidence" that Dr. Farrell's negligence
was a cause of her blindness. This, she had. What won the case for her
was that Dr. Farrell could not muster more evidence than Mrs. Snell to
prove that either he was not a cause or that some other cause was more
likely than not the cause of her blindness. The case was an evidentiary
draw, with each party having some evidence of causation but not enough
to prove or disprove causation on a more likely than not sufficiency. The
causal inference thus works by calling the draw in favour of Mrs. Snell,
using a robust and pragmatic approach to what happened. And what is that
robust and pragmatic approach? The court had, on the one hand, a woman
who underwent an eye operation to help her and instead became blind. On
the other hand, the court had a physician whose conduct Mrs. Snell had
proven had fallen below the applicable standard of care for a physician. In
calling the causal draw in a fault-based tort system, the causal ties go to
Mrs. Snell. The causal inference and robust and pragmatic approach, then,
are merely evidentiary tools to assist in causal draws in litigation. Nothing
more.
2. Common sense and the spirit of Snell v. Farrell
And what of "common sense" and the "robust and pragmatic approach?"
How does that fit into the causal picture? The spirit of Snell was to bring
causal proof into reality, and away from overly rigid, scientific thresholds
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of evidence. The point is this: why spend precious litigation resources in
forcing parties to prove things that, in the real world, may be painfully
obvious? The adversarial system can often turn the simplest dispute into a
battle of the experts. Not everything requires proof to a scientific degree. In
fact, much should not be proven to such a degree. Not only is it wasteful but
it overly complicates what is often a simple issue. "Robust and pragmatic"
is nothing more than calling for an all-encompassing, contextual and
practical approach to proving causation-step away from causal rigidity
if the situation demands. An elevator falls because gravity pulls it down.
There may be many reasons why an elevator malfunctions, but it is difficult
to imagine any of them where negligence is not front and centre as a cause.
A plaintiff is often not in a position to prove much more than the fact that
the elevator should not have fallen. The Snell spirit recalls the concept
of circumstantial evidence which absorbed the prior doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.4 5 There are some things that, in certain circumstances and with
no evidence to the contrary, are obvious and, with simple common sense,
should not require complex proof. All Sopinka was saying in Snell was
that courts should be mindful of these instances when weighing evidence
in difficult causation questions.4 6 Evidence for evidence's sake should be
avoided where a causal draw can be decided without further impossible
evidentiary burdens to meet.
How is common sense applied in Snell? The answer lies in how a court
faced with a causal draw situation takes a step back and asks the tough
question: "just what really happened here?" Forcing Mrs. Snell to provide
proof on a balance of probabilities when it is logically or scientifically
impossible to do so is manifestly unfair. Similarly, it would be manifestly
unfair to ask Dr. Farrell to disprove his own negligence as a potential cause
when it is logically or scientifically impossible to do so. The common
sense, robust, pragmatic thing to do is to acknowledge that Mrs. Snell, in
her position as patient, could not possibly prove causation beyond what she
was able. Similarly, if Dr. Farrell also did not have evidence to convince a
45. Res ipsa loquitur, the "thing speaks for itself," is an evidentiary doctrine that had often been used
to assist in proving causation in negligence cases where a court can infer factual circumstances simply
because surrounding factual circumstances happened and it is knowable that such actions generally
could not occur without the presence of negligence. See i.e. the classic case of Byrne v. Boadle, [1863]
159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch.) (plaintiff hit by sack of flour from overhead window and, even though the
plaintiff could not prove what happened, the accident was held to be the fault of the bakery located
above because such accidents do not normally happen except in the presence of negligence). This
doctrine was replaced by the less rigid concept of circumstantial evidence, in Fontaine v. British
Columbia (Official Administrator), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 424.
46. Lara Khoury notes that Snell "generous pro-plaintiff attitude" has been reserved for cases of
"'true' uncertainty" about causation. See Lara Khoury, Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability
(Oxford: Hart, 2003) at 171.
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court on a balance of probabilities as to causation, the court ought to decide
the case somehow. If there is an evidentiary draw in proving causation, ties
go to Mrs. Snell in this peculiar circumstance.
The problem with the common sense, robust and pragmatic approach
is that it has somehow lost its sheen in the courtroom. Courts still appear to
require proof of causation on a balance of probabilities even in draw cases,
and are reluctant to split the difference in draw cases. There are several
reasons why this is so. The first is perhaps a simple over-use of the Snell
stance on evidence. If a party adduces some evidence of causation and then
asks for a common sense causal inference, the inference will not be made
if the opposing party has more persuasive evidence of causation. The Snell
concept has worn thin because many courts and litigants have forgotten
that the purpose of causation in negligence is to link the defendant's
breach of the standard of care to its causal role in the plaintiff's injury. All
too often, courts focus not on the fault connection but instead on causation
as an explanatory process for discussing "what happened." Plaintiffs are
not suing to discover what happened. The causation step is much more
limited than that. The Snell concept is not an excuse for lack of causal
evidence. It assists in evidentiary draws about causation in questions about
fault. The second reason why the spirit of Snell is often ignored is the use
of the Snell concept any time evidence about causation appears mildly
complex or reliant on scientific opinion. But that is not the spirit of Snell.
It is not about getting around complexity, scientific or not. Science hardly
ever relies on layperson common sense. That is why it is science. Science
most often will have two competing answers to a causal question. The
weighing of one answer over the other only requires an appeal to common
sense when there is, in fact, a draw.
The final reason the common sense, robust and pragmatic approach
to the facts has fallen out of fashion may be that the overly complicated
way cases are litigated has removed the facts themselves from common
sense application. There is a tendency to require a scientific evidentiary
explanation for everything. A court does not have to make a tough
decision if an expert provides the answer, wrapped in a neat package with
complicated terminology and referenced by peer-reviewed scholarship.
It is far easier to believe one expert's opinion than be required to come
to one's own common sense opinion and test it in the public sphere and
appellate courts.
3. How much evidence? Delay in treatmentcases
Nowhere is the lack of effect of Snells common sense, robust and
pragmatic approach more evident than in delay in treatment cases which
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fail for reasons of evidentiary insufficiency about causation. Recall that, in
Snell, in order for an evidentiary causal inference to be made, the plaintiff
must at least adduce "very little affirmative evidence" upon which to build
the inference. There must be some evidence of the defendant's breach of
the standard of care as being a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's harm.
In addition, the defendant must not have adduced evidence rebutting that
presumption to a greater degree. There must be an evidentiary draw. The
important point is that the plaintiff must have some evidence-Snell does
not make up evidence where none exists.
A trio of Ontario Court of Appeal cases make this point. In Cottrelle v.
47
a plaintiff with pre-existing diabetes suffered a leg wound and
Gerrard,
eventually lost her leg to gangrene. Her physician delayed treatment twice.
The Court ofAppeal reversed the trial judge's finding of causation because
it held that there was no evidence from the plantiff which proved, on a
balance of probabilities, that the delay in treatment caused the loss of this
plaintiff's leg. In fact, the Court found that the defence expert's testimony
proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the leg was not capable of being
saved even with treatment (and even though the treatment fell below the
applicable standard of care). The plaintiff's problem on causation was that
she did not have evidence to satisfy, on a balance of probabilities, that
the delayed treatment caused her some injury. The Court gave credence
to the defendant's expert, who did have a theory as to the loss. The Snell
principle of causal inference did not assist when there was no causal
evidence from the plaintiff and where there was definite causal evidence
from the defence.
Similar results occurred in two other cases, Aristorenas48 and Barker.49
In Aristorenas,the plaintiff patient went into the hospital to have a baby. She
left the hospital and developed flesh-eating disease at the C-section wound
site shortly thereafter. As in Cottrelle, the majority of the Court of Appeal
for Ontario reversed the trial judge's finding of causation because Ms.
Aristorenas adduced no evidence linking the negligent delay in treatment
she received with such delay being a potential cause of her harm (again,
even though the treatment fell below the applicable standard of care). In
Barker, the defendant physician also negligently delayed treatment for a
patient who was suffering from a bowel obstruction. The majority of the
Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's finding on causation and held
that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence that the delay in treatment

47.
48.
49.

(2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.).
Aristorenasv. ComCare Health (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 282 (C.A.).
Barker v. Montfort Hospital(2007), 278 D.L.R. (4th) 215 (Ont. C.A.).
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was the cause of her bowel obstruction. The Snell principle was again not
helpful because there was no evidentiary draw--evidence was just absent.
So, the minor point to make from these cases is this: Snell can be helpful
to a plaintiff who has at least some evidence linking negligent behaviour
to causation. However, Snell is not helpful in the absence of any evidence
on causation.
The major, and more important, point to make about these cases is
this: sometimes, the Snell requirement of "very little affirmative evidence"
runs aground of the common sense,. robust and pragmatic approach to
the facts. These delay in treatment cases are completely opposite to the
larger spirit of Snell about tempering proof of causation in negligence with
simple common sense. The majority of the Court of Appeal in each of
the cases demanded proof of something obvious."o This is precisely what
courts are not supposed to do. This is the robust and pragmatic approach
in reverse. The Court demanded some evidence of what appears to be a
fundamentally common sense point of life: a delay in treatment can cause
injury. Who could deny this? Does one require an expert to hop up on the
stand and testify to something that any layperson could intuit? That is not
the approach in the spirit of Snell. The dissenting opinions in Aristorenas
and Barker spoke to precisely this issue. MacPherson J.A. in Aristorenas
and Weiler J.A. in Barker both used Snell 's causal inference approach to
find that the plaintiff had led enough evidence to conclude, on a balance of
probabilities, that the plaintiff had properly proven causation. They took
a common sense view of causation unhindered by the strict trappings of
science. The difference in reasoning between the majority and minority
in-these cases, as well as between the majority and the trial judges, is the
weighing of evidence.
Take each of the three cases. In Cottrelle, the Court demanded evidence
that a particular delay in treatment did not harm the plaintiff. Recall that
an at-fault defendant only has to be "a" cause of an injury, not "the" cause.
Here, can a plaintiff really be put to the cost of adducing expert evidence
to testify that a particular physician's unreasonable delay in managing a
diabetic patient with a gangrenous wound may have some causal role in
the resulting amputation? If a physician leaves a patient unattended for
an unreasonable time, what good can come of it? Does it hurt the patient?
It certainly does not help the situation. Is this common sense, to demand

50. Or, at least, unnecessarily particularistic. See i.e. John G. Fleming, "Probabilistic Causation in
Tort Law" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 661 and John G. Fleming, "Probabilistic Causation in Tort Law: A
Postscript" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 136 (noting that courts traditionally prefer particularistic evidence
of a specific plaintiff and a specific defendant to probabilistic evidence of causal generalities).
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expert evidence of something that really does seem obvious in a general
sort of way? If the issue in the case was whether or not the plaintiff would
be in the same position in any event, that is a crumbling skull issue rightly
left for the damages phase. But here, the Court chastized the plaintiff for
failing to lead evidence of causation. The Court in Cottrelle demanded
precisely what Justice Sopinka said was not required-scientific evidence
of causation, devoid of common sense. It seems the majority of the Court
of Appeal is using evidentiary process to trump common sense. Better to
place an expert on the stand to at least say "something" about causation,
even if it is painfully obvious to all in the courtroom (although, curiously,
the plaintiff in this case did just this-and still did not have enough
evidence to reach the level of a balance of probabilities, on re-weighing by
the Court of Appeal).
The example is even more striking with Aristorenas and Barker. In
those cases, the majority of the Court indicated that the plaintiffs had "no
evidence" of causation at all. Again, could the reason there was, on the
written trial record, no evidence of causation actually be because it is just
common sense that, in Aristorenas,negligently leaving a woman's wound
untended could certainly lead to some injury (flesh-eating disease or not).
Or instead, in Barker, that negligently leaving a woman with a bowel
obstruction unattended in the hospital could lead to loss of her bowel? How
could one adduce evidence that these particular delays were not a potential
cause of the resulting injuries? None of the cases fail "but for" causation,
when one focuses on the fundamental requirement that a defendant's
negligence only has to be "a" cause of the plaintiff's resulting injuries. Yet
the cases fail because of an overly rigid and literal adherence to one aspect
of Snell v. Farrell: the requirement of "very little affirmative evidence"
on causation. The minority decisions by MacPherson and Weiler JJ.A., by
contrast, do find evidence of causation with which to make an inference.
In Aristorenas, for example, it is a mystery as to what the etiology of flesheating disease really is. But the causation question does not ask the plaintiff
to prove what causes flesh-eating disease. The causation question attempts
to assess whether the defendant's breach of the applicable standard of care
caused some injury to the plaintiff. How could a delay in treatment not
cause "some" harm? The lesson here from the Court of Appeal in these
cases must sadly be, then, that every plaintiff must be put to the cost of
putting someone-anyone-on the witness stand to conjecture explicitly
about causation. Because once the "very little affirmative evidence"
is adduced, a plaintiff can then utilize the common sense, robust and
pragmatic approach in Snell and ask for a causal inference. Of course, that
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inference can, and often will, be rebutted by defence evidence." But then
the issue goes to weight and not mere presence or absence of evidence at
all. At the appellate level, Snell spirit has been reversed.52
VI. Thin skulls and crumbling skulls are not causation issues
Issues of the thin-skulled plaintiff and the crumbling skull plaintiff are
not causation issues, though they are often confused as such, particularly
because each features in the Supreme Court's Athey v. Leonati decision.
The thin-skulled inquiry comes into play only after "but for" causation has
been proven, at the remoteness or proximate cause stage." The crumbling
skull issue is a damages question. The causation step in the negligence
analysis deals with the defendant's responsibility for the plaintiff's injury
occurring. Remoteness and damages steps deal with the defendant's
responsibility for the extent of the harm. 54
The Supreme Court of Canada in Blackwater v. Plint,5 a case about
latent psychological harms for residential school abuse, dubs the crumbling
skull issue one of damages. In Blackwater, the Supreme Court held that, so
long as the defendant's negligence is "a" cause of the plaintiff's injuries,
causation is proven, even though there may exist other potential tortious
and non-tortious causes of the injury. The defendant is fully liable for the
plaintiff's injuries. At the damages inquiry, the original position of the
plaintiff is considered (i.e., pre-existing conditions).

51. This is an answer to the problem Vaughan Black and David Cheifetz see with Hanke's restriction
of the material contribution test. They argue that, because an injured patient can often only prove
that the delayed treatment augmented the possibility of injury, but cannot muster proof on a balance
of probabilities of such, a plaintiff in a circular or dependency causation case would lose because
causation must be proven on a balance of probabilities. While that is true, their analysis may not be
accounting for the causal inference in cases of evidentiary draws, thanks to Snell v. Farrell, which
allows a court to augment.the plaintiff's causal proof to the level of a balance of probabilities. See
Black & Cheifetz (2007), supra note 4 at 252.
52. The practical effect, at least at the appellate level, is in keeping with what Vaughan Black
notes as a "defendant-favouring turn in civil liability." See Black & Cheifetz (2007), supra note 4.
Interestingly, in 2002, Black noted a "plaintiff-favouring drift" in the law of causation in Canada. See
Black (2002), supranote 4.
53. Blackwater, supranote 9.
54. Lewis Klar notes that the causation question in negligence is really about two distinct issues:
1. did the defendant's negligence cause the plaintiff injury? (a "yes" or "no" answer); and, 2. to what
extent is the defendant's negligence responsible for the losses? (a more complex answer). Klar may
not be tracking the Supreme Court here in characterizing the extent issue as one of causation. See
Lewis Klar, Tort Law, 3d. ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at 408. Justice Linden dubbs extent of harm
issues as a remoteness/foreseeability issue (i.e was the extent of injuries foreseeable or from another
source?). Allen M. Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 8th ed. (Markham: Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, 2006) at 384. This, too, does not track the Supreme Court law on the issue, as noted in
Blackwater supranote 9. Regardless of what the issue is, extent is certainly different than cause.
55. Blackwater, supranote 9.
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According to the Court in Blackwater, the defendant is only liable for
the losses that flow from his negligent conduct. There is no compensation
for damages the plaintiff would have suffered in any event, regardless of
the defendant's negligence. A plaintiff is only entitled to be put back in the
same position he was in before the accident-no better and no worse. That
is the guiding principle from Athey,5 6 reaffirmed in Blackwater.
The Court in Athey puts it as follows: the plaintiff's position must
be determined both before and after the tort. The Court must assess what
the "original" position would have been, without the tort. The difference
between the "original" position and the "injured" position is the plaintiff's
loss for which the defendant must compensate. This approach was
confirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Mizzi v. Hopkins" as
regards a jury instruction, and is discussed in the section below. These,
though, are questions for the damages phase of the negligence analysis.
1. Thin skull and crumbling skull are "extent" questions
The Supreme Court in Blackwater highlighted the crumbling skull principle
and the thin skull principle. The thin skull rule holds that the defendant
takes his victim as he finds him. If the victim is overly susceptible to harm,
and suffers greater than foreseeable harm as a result of the defendant's
negligence, the defendant is liable for the entire harm, not just for harm
that one might think foreseeable for a "normal," healthy person." If it were
the case that a plaintiff suffered greater pain, discomfort, and resulting
complications than would a normal plaintiff, because of some prior
predisposition or other latent health condition, the defendant is liable for
that heightened reaction. This would likely translate into a higher general
damages award for the injuries for which the defendant is responsible. In
short, she suffered hurt more because of her innate qualities, so she can
be compensated for more (if such is true-i.e., if a healthy person would
have had less pain, less complications, and bounced back earlier). Again,
remember that this is only directed at the harm for which the defendant
is responsible, not that harm which would have occurred anyway. In
Blackwater, for example, the fact that the sexual assault victim had prior

56. Athey, supra note 9.
57. (2003). 64 O.R. (3d) 365 (C.A.).
58. This concept has recently been called into question with the Supreme Court's decision in
Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114. In that case, psychiatric
injury was subjected to a foreseeability threshold in order to be compensable. The entire case may
be viewed as setting a minimal threshold for what is compensable injury in Canada. As long as the
reasonable defendant could foresee "some" injury, the injury is compensable. If no injury at all is
foreseeable, as was the case when the plaintiff in Mustapha suffered serious and debilitating illness
after seeing a fly in drinking water, then the injury does not rise to the level of a compensable injury.
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trauma before going to the school meant that the defendant's sexual assault
at school might have had a greater impact on him and the victim would
be compensated more, as he was pre-disposed because of the pre-existing
trauma. This was a damages question, not causation. In short, if a large
reason an injured plaintiff ends up with a greater injury is because of her
prior health issues, prior injuries, or prior experience "primed" her for
susceptibility for this very reaction, or "set the stage" for it, the defendant
is liable for the full extent of the loss. "But for" causation is proven and
the question moves to remoteness to assess the "extent" of the negligent
defendant's responsibility to pay for the resulting harm.
The crumbling skull idea involves a degenerative condition which
the plaintiff has pre-accident which ultimately would have resulted in the
same type of injury as caused by the defendant. The accident accelerates
the process of degeneration. The defendant is only liable for the effect
of the accident on the degenerative process, as was held in Athey. In the
typical case, a negligent defendant is responsible for the entire harm unless
it can be proven the plaintiff would have suffered some of the harm in
any event. The job is to carve out what harm was accident-related, and
what was inevitably the result of nature. Perhaps the injuries are divisible.
Perhaps not. Athey presupposes that separation of harm for which the
defendant is responsible is certainly possible where some of the injuries
have tortious causes and some have non-tortious causes. In Blackwater,
the Court held that the effect of the sexual assault on the victim's already
damaged condition must be determined. The defendant was only liable
for the damages caused by the assault. Again, this is a damages question,
according to the Court.
It is therefore often simple for a plaintiff to combat a defence argument
that, although the defendant breached the standard of care and that breach
caused some harm to the plaintiff, the defendant should nevertheless be
liable for nothing, because the plaintiff would be in the same position she
is in even if the defendant's negligence never happened. The fact remains
that, in the vast majority of cases, the defendant's breach of the standard of
care caused some injuries, it perhaps caused greater injuries as a result of a
plaintiff's thin skull, and it often results in the earlier loss of the plaintiff's
productive, self-sufficient life. So the defendant's negligence caused some
damage. The question becomes one of extent. Certainly at the very least,
most negligent conduct makes a plaintiff's degeneration toward her current
symptoms much more painful (thin skull) and accelerated the harm. So the
extent is greater than if nature took its course (if it could ever even be
proven that nature would take such an eventual course). It thus defies logic
to argue that the negligent defendant would be liable for nothing. He or
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she is generally liable for something, if "but for" causation is proven; the
question is to what extent.5 9
2. Extent of harm at the damages phase
Courts consider factors that indicate the plaintiff's loss might have
occurred regardless of the defendant's negligence. The Supreme Court in
Athey confirmed that hypothetical events such as how the plaintiff's life
would have proceeded without the tortious injury need not be proven on a
balance of probabilities. Courts use realistic possible contingencies at the
damages phase and such contingencies are given weight according to their
likelihood. It is important to note that the factors affecting the damages do
not need to be established on a balance of probabilities as things that will
happen. They can be established as possibilities and if the court is satisfied
that they are "real" possibilities, the court can discount the damage award
to reflect them. It is irrelevant whether or not these factors are natural or
tortious If there is a measurable risk that a pre-existing condition would
have detrimentally affected the plaintiff in the future, regardless of the
defendant's negligence, the principles in Athey hold that this is accounted
for in reducing the overall award at the damages phase. The plaintiff must
be returned to her original position, with all the risks and shortcomings of
that, and not put in a better position.
For example, if a court finds there is a 30% chance or risk of a future
event occurring which might increase damages, then 30% of the total
damages calculated for that issue may be awarded. The same principles
apply for a damages reduction for future events, as held by the Ontario
6'
Court of Appeal in Graham v. Rourke6 0 and Koukounakis v. Stainrod.
In those cases, the Court held that the fact-finder must compare "the
individual plaintiff's anticipated lot in life after the accident with that
which the plaintiff would have enjoyed but for the accident,"62 considering
"real and substantial future possibilities, both positive and negative.""
Damages are only adjusted as per Athey if there is a "measurable
risk that the pre-existing condition would have detrimentally affected the
plaintiff in the future, regardless of the defendant's negligence."64 The key
is in establishing the "original" position as if the tort had not occurred,
59. Although, theoretically, the extent may be "zero." In practical reality, however, it is hard to
imagine the case where some negligent conduct on the part of a defendant which involved some
contact with the plaintiff would not cause at least some compensable harm.
60. (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 622 (C.A.) at 644.
61. (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 299 (C.A.) at para. 14.
62. Ibid. at para. 14.
63. Graham, supra note 60 at 644.
64. A they, supra note 9 at para. 64.
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and comparing it to the post-accident position.65 However, recall that
positive contingencies can be adduced as well, even within the context
of a seemingly overall negative contingency. Because these are future
speculations, a plaintiff can adduce evidence that her accident, in effect,
may have compromised her ability to fight the pre-existing condition.
That is a compelling argument, and one which should not be ignored. That
should likely reduce the contingent reduction for the inevitability factor
while also increasing the level of damages as she would be categorized
as a thin-skulled plaintiff. In other words, the negligent conduct of the
defendant interfered with the plaintiff's ability to stave off whatever
condition she was inevitably going to have in any event.
Indeed, one of the disadvantages of a defendant arguing for the
application of the "crumbling skull" doctrine is that it cuts so close to
appearing to be a thin-skulled plaintiff situation. It is difficult to avoid
the dichotomy in a difficult case, such as where a defendant may end
up acknowledging the plaintiff's thin-skulled position to get to the
"crumbling skull" damages reductions. The "crumbling skull" doctrine
acts to potentially decrease the damages award on a negative contingency
basis. However, the thin-skulled plaintiff is entitled to greater damages for
greater harm suffered because of her greater susceptibility to harm. The
thin-skulled rule is not subject to any potential uncertain guesswork on its
application-the plaintiff is entitled to the full extent of her damages. So,
in attempting to prove the "crumbling skull" notion, a defendant may often
end up adducing evidence of the plaintiff's thin skull, thus defeating the
tactic in the first place.
By the same token, a crumbling skull can also have strong thin-skull
attributes which can benefit a plaintiff. Assume a defendant can prove that
the plaintiff would have suffered a similar condition in the future even
without the defendant's negligence. Still, the plaintiff is in a position to
prove that the accident has caused greater damage because it has rendered
her unable to prolong the inevitable. That is the thin skull principle, in a

65. See i.e., Agar v. Morgan 2005 BCCA 579, 47 B.C.L.R. (4th) 36 (motor vehicle accident
accelerated plaintiff's need for a double lung transplant which would have been required at a later
time, apart from the accident); Haney v. Malischewski (1997), 41 B.C.L.R. (3d) 230 (B.C.S.C.),'leave
to appeal to B.C.C.A. refused (1999) B.C.C.A. 500 (motor vehicle accident triggered symptoms
of multiple sclerosis in 26 year old plaintiff); York v. Johnston (1997), 37 B.C.L.R. (3d) 235 (C.A.)
(motor vehicle accident triggered multiple sclerosis in 51 year old plaintiff who had symptoms of the
disease but had been symptom-free for 10 years prior); and Edgar v. Freedman (1997), 40 B.C.L.R.
(3d) 87 (C.A.) (post-accident re-growth of second brain tumor affected plaintiff's original position).
Contrast these cases with McAllister v. Sotelo, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2132 (S.C.), where the trial court
held that the plaintiff had not proven that the motor vehicle accident accelerated his multiple sclerosis.
Instead, the court held the disease progressed on its own, regardless of the accident.
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way. She was going downhill, but now faster, and at a more unpleasant
rate. So although the time frame is shorter, the damages should be
concomitantly higher.66 The tortfeasor, in essence, caused greater harm by
the fact that the plaintiff had this condition already. It is more markedly
acute in terms of discomfort, psychological upset from the acceleration,
potential for reduced life expectancy, reduced working life, and reduced
range of activity. That is why the cases tend to raise the level of damages
award for a "healthy" individual, though they do then reduce it for a
contingency based on the inevitable decline. Perhaps those courts operate
under the principle of "much better to reduce an award that starts higher."
VII. What Canadiancausation is not
Some commentators argue that the Canadian causation landscape should
change to incorporate a causal test for risk creation alone, without a factual
component implicating negligent behaviour as a cause of the plaintiff's
injury.67 If a defendant creates a risk and the plaintiff is exposed to the risk,
risk exposure alone should be sufficient to prove causation. This perhaps
goes too far past what Stapleton casts as "causal involvement." It leads
instead to a sort of causal indeterminacy where proof in a fault-based tort
system is on statistical risk alone. Canadian tort law is not there yet, though
it is getting closer, as Russell Brown6 and Lara Khoury 69 separately note.
Nor is Canadian causation law yet determining causation for extra-tortious
reasons. In some instances, such as in Snell v. Farrell or Cook v. Lewis,
the defendant's negligence destroys the plaintiff's very ability to prove
causation. The Canadian causation calculus, to date, does not consider a
defendant's liability to be based in any way on the defendant's role in
destruction of causal evidence.7 0
Conclusion: causationclarified
In conclusion, the law of causation in Canada has often been decried as
confusing. Despite the Supreme Court of Canada's economy of language
in causation cases, the law can be seen as actually quite consistent and
simple, as long as one keeps at the forefront the notion that the causation
test is designed to asses liability for harm caused by fault-based behaviour.
66. As the British Columbia cases, ibid, appear to suggest in the damages numbers.
67. See i.e., Brown, supra note 4; Collins, supra note 4; and Gerecke, supra note 4.
68. See Brown, supra note 4.
69. See Khoury, supra note 44 at 213-219. Khoury proposes a solution at 219: if a court is to
compensate for increased risk, a plaintiff should have to demonstrate the link between the negligent
behaviour which increased the risk and the actual realization of that risk. This proposal duly tracks the
requirements of the material contribution test in Hanke.
70. See i.e. Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), and Brown, supranote 4 at 453-454.
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Most of the challenges in understanding the jurisprudence about causation
come from confusing the message in the cases as directing a shift in the
standard "but for" causation test. In fact, most cases are instead about
evidentiary sufficiency in causation. The only instances where litigants are
predictably able to step outside the standard "but for" test are in situations
involving circular causation and dependency causation. The spirit of Snell
v. Farrell,as an evidentiary sufficiency guideline, may be missing its mark
in the courts, particularly in delay in treatment cases.
A brief concluding summary of the fundamental concepts of Canadian
causation law may prove helpful:
a) Negligence law is a fault-based inquiry requiring a link between
breach of an applicable standard of care with some harm to an
injured accident victim in order to-trigger compensation for the
victim;
b) The default doctrinal test for causation in negligence is the "but
for" test;
c) The focus of the causal inquiry is on the defendant's breach of
the standard of care as a potential cause for some injury to the
plaintiff;
d) Causation must be proven on a balance of probabilities;
e) A plaintiff need only prove that a defendant's breach of the
standard of care is "a" cause of her injuries;
f) The material contribution test for causation is a rare and exceptional
test, reserved only when the "but for" test fails;
g) The "but for" test rarely fails, and currently only in situations
involving circular causation and dependency causation:
1) Circular causation involves factual situations where it is
impossible for the plaintiff to prove which one of two or more
possible tortious causes are the cause of the plaintiff's harm;
2) Dependency causation involves factual situations where it is
impossible for the plaintiff to prove if a third party would have
taken some action in the face of a defendant's negligence and
such third party's action would have facilitated harm to the
plaintiff;
h) If the "but for" test fails, the plaintiff must meet two pre-conditions
to utilize the material contribution test for causation:
1) It must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove causation (either
due to circular or dependency causation); and,
2) The plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant breached
the standard of care, exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable
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risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have suffered that type of
injury.
i) The "robust and pragmatic" common sense approach to causation
from Snell v. Farrellis an evidentiary sufficiency device that helps
to solve evidentiary draws, providing the plaintiff has at least
proffered "very little affirmative evidence" about causation;
j) If the victim is overly susceptible to harm, and suffers greater than
foreseeable harm as a result of the defendant's negligence, the
defendant is liable for the entire harm, not for just harm that one
might*think foreseeable for a "normal," healthy person (thin-skull
rule)-such a concept is triggered at the remoteness phase of the
negligence analysis and not at the causation phase;
k) A defendant is only liable for the extent of the plaintiff's injuries
caused by the defendant's negligence (crumbling skull rule)such a concept is triggered at the damages phase of the negligence
analysis and not at the causation phase.
It is hoped that this small contribution to the overwhelming constellation
of writings about causation at least serves as a facilitator in conversations
about this challenging subject in tort law. In fact, the author suspects the
article may, in fact, cause a little debate about causation. If so, all the
better, in a continuing effort to clarify causation.

